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1 Introduction
Most international agreements addressing
development and social issues are set out in non-
legally binding form which, in general, lacks
financial mechanisms to assist developing country
signatories tomeet agreed objectives.Any financial
assistance necessary for achieving goals set out in
such instruments is typically provided through
bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA)
and multilateral financial institutions.
The international climate change regime
established by the 1992 UNFrameworkConvention
onClimateChange (UNFCCC) and its 1997 Kyoto
Protocol, by contrast, boasts a complex and highly
innovative financial architecture. This architecture
is composed of two elements: (1) legal binding
commitments mandating Organisation for
Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD)
countries (known in the UNFCCC as Annex II
Parties) to provide “new and additional” financial
and technological resources to developing countries
to fulfil treaty commitments relating to reporting
and mitigation and also to assist developing
countries most at risk from the impacts of climate
change meet the costs of adaptation to climate
change; and (2) an institutional machinery to deliver
such financial and technological assistance to
developing countries. The core of this machinery
is a multilaterally governed financial mechanism,
operated by theGlobal Environment Facility (GEF)
in accordance with the political guidance of the
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. The
provision of financial and technological resources
through bilateral and other multilateral channels
is also permitted by the Convention.
As climate impacts increase, there are likely to
bemore calls on donor resources to address climate
change impacts through both mitigation and
adaptation strategies (see Huq and Reid, this
Bulletin).Althoughmany factors other than aid will
determine the availability of resources for the take
up of these options by developing countries (such
as opening up trade to developing countries and
reducing the burden of debt), for many countries
public financing will remain an important source
of assistance.
However, global trends in ODA funding now
indicate a stagnation or decline from earlier levels
that appears unlikely to be reversed (see Bezanson,
this Bulletin). This suggests much more policy
attention will need to be paid to ensure that existing
flows, whether under the Convention’s financial
mechanism or otherwise, are being used as
effectively as possible. This article focuses on how
donors could improve the delivery of climate aid.
Increased use of private sector finance for adaptation
and mitigation options is discussed by Hamilton
in her article on insurance and the financial services
sector and by Humphrey and Leach and Leach in
their articles on the Clean Development
Mechanisms, in this Bulletin.
This article begins by describing themain trends
in the size of aid flows and the structure of
disbursement, focusing particularly on the problems
associated with aid proliferation and fragmentation.
For those unfamiliar with the operation of the
Convention’s financial machinery, the next section
provides an overview of the climate change regime
financial architecture, including a brief overview
of its history and reforms in response to criticisms.
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The article then examines whether the financial
mechanism could enhance the effectiveness of
delivery ofODA on climate issues, highlighting in
particular the significance of large, parallel flows
of bilateral ODA for climate change programmes.
The concluding section examines the scope for
improvements in climate change aid and makes
some suggestions that may be useful in future policy
discussions.
2 Current trends in development
finance
Over the 1990s and into 2000, governments in the
developed world collectively cut aid budgets to
their lowest levels in real terms with five of theG-7
donors: USA, Italy, Germany, France and Japan,
failing to reverse a long-termdecline in aid (Watkins
andAmadi 2003).The additional financial resources
offered by developed countries on the eve of the
Finance for Development conference inMonterrey
were welcome, but did not match the necessary
additional resources needed to achieve
internationally agreed goals as set out in the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The
amount of resources needed to realise the MDGs
is, according toOxfam, an additionalUS$100 billion
a year in aid (Watkins andAmadi 2003: 326). This
sounds like a lot, but to put things in perspective,
according to the Congressional Budget Office, a
non-partisan body set up by the US Congress, the
war and occupation of Iraq by 130,000 US troops
cost about US$4–5 billion (£2.2–2.7 billion) per
month, or US$48–60 billion per year
(Congressional Budget Office 2004). With many
experts now believing that troops at this level, and
hence military expenditures, may be needed for
the next 3–5 years, it is likely that the costs of the
Iraq will be much larger than anticipated.
This article does not focus on the political
constraints limiting aid flows to their current,
inadequate levels, but focuses instead on improving
the efficiency of aid flows, because these issues need
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Figure 1: (a) ODA funding patterns in the 1960s; (b) Current (2004) ODA funding patterns
to be addressed now and evenmore so if aid budgets
rise in response to political pressures. As pointed
out by themost recent WorldDevelopment Report,
the way in which donors provide aid matters a lot
(World Bank 2004: 203).TheReport describes two
worrying trends in patterns of bilateral and
multilateral ODA: (1) the inordinate increase in
ODA donors and projects across developing
countries, resulting in proliferation of aid (World
Bank 2004: Ch. 11) and (2) a false belief in the
increased efficiency of providing aid to local or non-
governmental service providers, as opposed to
governments resulting in fragmentation of aid in
recipient countries.
To a large extent however, the prevalence of
direct project implementation outside the control
of formal governmental channels, which leads to
the fragmentation of aid at the recipient end, is a
direct result of the proliferation of aid by donors.
Proliferation is a creeping, structural change inODA
finance that has occurred over the last 30 years,
understood as the excessive multiplication of
sources and channels of development aid around
the world (Acharya et al. 2004; Knack andRahman
2003). Fragmentation is ameasure of the extent to
which proliferation has led to themultiplication of
sources of aid within an individual recipient country.
It is helpful to visualise the trend of proliferation
and of fragmentation diagrammatically:
Figure 1a is a rough representation of ODA
funding patterns in the 1960s. Flows originate from
relatively few bilateral andmultilateral sources and
are disbursed through few channels directly to
recipients in large quantities to governments. Figure
1b shows how the proliferation of bilateral and
multilateral donors (sources) has today resulted in
many more aid channels, often flowing via non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and in smaller
streams than before.
2.1 The adverse effects of proliferation
and fragmentation
The reality of donor proliferation and its effect on
individual countries has long been known. Some
20 years agoMorss (1984) recognised some of the
deleterious effects of this trend:
Instead of working to establish comprehensive
and consistent national development objectives
and policies, government officials are forced to
focus on pleasing donors by approving projects
that mirror the current development
“enthusiasm” of each donor. Further, efforts to
implement a large number of discrete, donor-
financed projects, each with its own specific
objectives and reporting requirements, use up
far more time and effort than is appropriate.
(Morss 1984: 465)
Although there is need for further empirical
research work to detail the localised impacts of
proliferation and fragmentation, the body of current
research and experience indicates that a trend
towards proliferation in the number ofODAdonors,
combined with the fragmentation of aid within
recipient countries, leads to higher transaction costs
and has wide-ranging negative effects such as
distorting host country priorities and undermining
local political accountability.
To gain a better understanding of whether the
actions of actual donors might be contributing to
undermining the value of aid through proliferation
and fragmentation, Acharya et al. (2004) have
recently attempted to better define aid proliferation,
measure it and examine its effects. Specifically, they
contribute to the literature by (1) categorising the
adverse effects of proliferation; (2) looking at the
patterns of proliferation and producing an indicator
of donor proliferation that ranks donors by the
degree to which they proliferate; (3) producing an
indicator for fragmentation of aid sources within
recipient countries; and (4) showing how the worst
proliferators supply aid to countries with the highest
levels of aid fragmentation.
Their central argument is that present patterns
of donor proliferation are creating significant
increases in the “fragmentation” of aid within
recipient countries, without aproportionate increase
in overall ODA funding to compensate. The
immediate consequence of such a trend is a very
large increase in the “transaction costs” incurred
by the executive agencies of recipient countries in
their engagements with aid donors which tends to
undermine the value of aid.
“Transaction costs”, both direct and indirect, are
those expenses that arise in the process of exchange
and trade, in this case between a donor and
developing country government (Newman 1998:
676).Direct transaction costs entail ‘the absorption
of scarce energies and attention of senior
government staff to an inefficient degree’ (Acharya
et al. 2004: 9). Indirect transaction costs refer to
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‘the creation of dysfunctionalbureaucratic behaviour
such as brain drain… the unwarranted continuation
of projects…officials protecting vested interests by
not reporting aid projects in public budgeting…
competition amongst donors [which] can lead to
unproductive behaviour such as hoarding of info
[and] an overall lack of responsibility for aid
outcomes’ (Acharya et al. 2004: 10).
For most donors, these types of costs are
considered anear-inevitable part of the development
business. Numerous attempts have been made to
reduce transaction costs by increasing aid
concentration. Policies have ranged from thorough
innovative techniques such as SWAps (sector-wide
approaches) to more traditional strategies such as
budgetary support, aid coordination and sector
specialisation. As reported in the 2004 World
Development Report most attempts into these
alternativemodels of organisation have either failed
or remain tentative due to formidable bureaucratic
and political constraints on changing each donor’s
funding procedures. These models and the
constraints upon their implementation will be
examined specifically in the context of climate
change, as discussed below.
2.2 Measuring proliferation and
fragmentation
The transaction costs incurred by the proliferation
and fragmentation of aid are virtually impossible
to quantify accurately. Themore tangible statistics
of donor and project proliferation are easier to
examine and thus used by Archaya et al. to create
an Index of Donor Proliferation (IDP). The IDP
ranks donors by the number of countries they are
involved in and the degree to which they spread
their aid equally amongst recipient countries or
concentrate it only on some. The index is based on
statistics from theOECDDevelopment Assistance
Committee (DAC) for average annual aid flows from
its members between 1999 and 2001.The IDP only
includes bilateral aid flows from donors since a
reliable, similarly compiled data set for aid to
multilaterals andNGOs was impossible to find (the
policy implications of this lack of data is discussed
below).
Using the IDP, Acharya et al. found that Germany
was the worst proliferator, granting aid to 135
countries, 76 per cent of which received less than
1 per cent of the total aid budget. It was followed
by Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
Portugal andGreece had the lowest scores. Perhaps
most disconcerting is the fact that the average
bilateral donor assisted 107 countries, and 80 per
cent of recipients received less than 1 per cent of
the donor’s aid budget (Archaya et al. 2004: 3).
Acharya and his colleagues deduce some interesting
common attributes among the worst proliferators.
Most of them are northern European, have little or
no colonial history and have relatively new ODA
programmes, distinguished by being more
“progressive” than others.1 The remainder had few
commonalities except that they tended to have
either small aid budgets or long colonial histories
(Acharya et al. 2004: 15).
Aid proliferation does not necessarily imply that
donors are all giving to the same recipients (they
may be giving aid more to ex-colonies or different
countries from other donors) so it was important
for Acharya et al. to check the extent of aid
fragmentation within recipient countries. To do
this, the authors devised an Index of Recipient
Fragmentation (IRF), incorporating the number of
donors each recipient interacts with and the relative
distribution of funding amongst donors to each
country.On average, each developing country was
found to be engaged with 26 official donors (11
multilateral and 14 bilateral) (Acharya et al. 2004:
2).There was also a large variation in the individual
IRF scores meaning that some dealt with very few
donors and some many more.
If the countries with the highest levels of
fragmentation were found to be receiving aid from
the worst proliferators, then there would be an
especially strong case for encouraging greater
concentration of aid among those proliferators (thus
reducing the transaction costs engendered by
fragmentation). The index was therefore regressed
against the average IDP score for all donors aiding
each recipient country as well as theGross National
Income (GNI) of each country. The hypothesis was
that aid recipients with high IRF scores would tend
to be (a) small (as measured by total GNI) and (b)
especially likely to receive aid from donors who
were proliferators.The authors found that there was
a strong correlation with small countries dealing
with inordinately large numbers of donors.2
Acharya et al. (2004) therefore demonstrate that
the most extreme bilateral proliferators tend to
concentrate their assistance on the aid recipients
who suffer the worst fragmentation problems, and
that these are often some of the smallest countries
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(with less government capacity). Their findings
imply that concentrating the funding patterns of
proliferators, for example, through better
coordination, would have a significant impact on
aid fragmentation and the associated transaction
costs. To date, however, donor coordination has
been difficult to achieve and success stories are rare
(Acharya et al. 2004: 20, see alsoWorld Bank 2004:
Ch. 11).
3 Funding for climate-related
activities
Does climate funding experience the same
proliferation and funding problems identified above
or does the financial architecture, comprising a
multilaterally governed financial mechanism,
operated by theGEF, result in greater efficiency and
coordination of aid? This section explains the
funding arrangements of the climate change regime,
outlining the history and original purpose of these
arrangements before addressing some of the
advantages this unique and innovative structure
has as well as criticisms voiced from developing
and developed countries alike.
3.1 The Convention’s financial mechanism
Unlikemost other fields of development assistance,
the unique feature of climate change finance is that
it has a centralised financial mechanism subject to
the political authority of the Parties. This was
negotiated in the run up to the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit during which developing countries
demanded a global fund under the political control
of countries in place of the Global Environment
Facility. The GEF had been set up by donors in
1991 under the authority of theWorld Bank to pre-
empt G-77 demands and predictably was
constitutionally and administratively weighted in
favour of donor interests.This proved unacceptable
to developing countries who demanded (and got)
more balanced arrangements (for amore detailed
description of theConvention’s negotiating history
and its provisions, see Yamin andDepledge 2004).
Article 11 of the UNFCCC lays out the
compromise which provides for ‘amechanism for
the provision of financial resources on a grant or
concessional basis, including for the transfer of
technology’ which ‘shall have an equitable and
balanced representation of all Parties within a
transparent system of governance’. TheGEF is the
official “operating entity” of the Convention’s
financial mechanism (in fact theGEF also services
the Biodiversity Convention as well as dealing with
focal areas such as ozone, international waters, land
degradation and persistent organic compounds).
On climate-related matters, the GEF functions
under the close guidance of the UNFCCC
Conference of Parties (COP) to which it submits
an annual report. The COP convenes once a year;
where among other things it examines and clarifies
the way in which the GEF has implemented COP
guidance on its policies, programme priorities and
eligibility criteria. The COP does not interfere in
the day-to-day management of the GEF, to avoid
donor micro-management and undue political
interference by recipients (common aid problems).
Projects and programmes to be funded by theGEF
are devised by countries and implemented with
assistance by one of the GEF’s “Implementing
Agencies”, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), World Bank and United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) along
with seven other agencies who can help countries
design, develop and implement projects.Although
theWorld Bank administers allGEF funds, and the
GEF Secretariat is housed within the Bank, the Bank
does not have any political control over GEF
operations, which are operationally distinct.
The operational aspects of the GEF’s work is
overseen by the GEF’s own governance structure,
the key to which is the GEF Governing Council.
TheCouncil is responsible for all major operational
decisions. Broader changes in overall policy and
the “GEF Instrument”3 are made by the Assembly,
whichmeets every three years and is composed of
all of its 175 member governments. The Council
presently consists of 32 geographical constituencies
with 16 seats for developing countries, 14 for
developed countries and 2 for “economies in
transition”.4 Decisions are made by consensus or
failing that by double majority (i.e. a majority of
donors and a majority of recipients). Unlike the
BrettonWoods institutions, which have decision-
making structures underpinned by donor
contributions, theGEF’s governance structuremore
fairly represent the interests of developing countries
and other beneficiaries as well as donors, in a sense
creating a hybrid between the UN and Bretton
Woods system of representation (Sjöberg: 156).
Apart from Convention reporting related
requirements and linked capacity building activities,
which the GEF must fund in full, one of the key
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fundamental policies of theGEF is to limit project
funding for developing countries to the “agreed
incremental costs” of attaining global environmental
benefits.5 As explained by Huq and Reid in this
Bulletin, the concept of incremental costs is relatively
easy to apply to mitigation projects but more
problematic to apply to adaptation projects as the
majority of these results in national benefits.
3.2 Funding sources and channels
Financial contributions to theGEF are collected in
voluntary replenishments once every four years
and disbursed among the agreed GEF focal areas.
According to Yamin and Depledge (forthcoming
2004), from 1991 to June 2003, GEF grants to
climate change activities totalled US$1.6 billion
(out of a total of US$4.4 billion for all focal areas)
with an additionalUS$9 billion contributed through
co-financing.6Over themost recent reporting period
(July 2001–May 2002), total project financing for
climate change activities exceededUS$ 901million,
of which the GEF provided US$ 136 million in
grant financing.
It is important to note, however, as allowed in
the Convention, not all climate-related funding
goes through theGEF as some is provided through
bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.
An assessment in 2001 by UNFCCCbodies ofGEF
and non-GEF funding for national communications
(reports due under the UNFCCC, as opposed to
greenhouse gas reducing mitigation projects or
adaptation) showed that the GEF provided $79.6
million with non-GEF sources providing US$54
million, a ratio of 60:40.7 Thus assessing the total
amount of climate-related funding provided by
Annex II Parties, and other Parties not so listed, is
more complex than totalling GEF contributions
indicating there is adegree of proliferation occurring
in the climate regime (the policy implications of
this are discussed below).
The scale of funds for climate mitigation and
adaptation projects flowing outside theConvention’s
financial machinery is significant. Recent work by
the OECD DAC has concluded that in general
bilateralODA activities targeting the objectives of
the UNFCCC are few and represent a small share
of total bilateral aid, an annual average of 7.2 per
cent of OECD members’ total bilateral ODA
commitments in 1998–2000, which amounted to
some US$2.7 billion annually.8 Of course, the 7.3
per cent represents quite a sizeable sum when
compared with theUS$2.97 billion in total pledged
to the GEF to cover the next four years for all six
focal areas.
As far as future funding is concerned, in 2001
theEU together withCanada, Iceland, New Zealand,
Norway and Switzerland pledged to theCOP they
would provide a total of US$408 million (or 450
million euros) per annum by the end of 2005 for
allocation to climate change. The text of their joint
declaration stated that this funding could include
contributions to theGEF, bilateral andmultilateral
funding additional to current levels, funding for
the three new funds established by COP 7 (see
below) and funding derived from the share of
proceeds of the Clean Development Mechanism.
This gives donors considerable flexibility to decide
which channels they will use to disburse funds and
thus has a direct bearing on whether funding for
climate activities in the climate regime will be subject
to more proliferation or less.
Until 2001, allGEF funding for climate change
was channelled by the GEF through a single trust
fund, called the GEF Trust Fund for Climate
Change. Dissatisfaction with the concept of
incremental costs, USA withdrawal from the
Protocol and the desire to give funding priorities
to certain groups of countries (the Least Developed
Countries, LDCs) and activities (like adaptation)
resulted in pressures to reorganise how the GEF
handled climate finances (see Huq and Reid, this
Bulletin).COP 7, held inMarrakesh in 2001, created
three additional new funds in the climate regime,
all of which will be operated by theGEF. The three
funds (described in more detail by Huq and Reid,
this Bulletin) are:
n Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)
n Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF)
n Adaptation Fund
The SCCF and LDCFunds are established under
the Convention and thus come into operation as
soon as theCOP gives guidance to theGEF, which
it has recently done at the COP 9 in Milan 2003.
For legal reasons (essentially because the protocol
has not yet entered into force and the USA will
remain a non-party when it does), a legally distinct
fund, known as the Adaptation Fund, had to be
established under the protocol, which is not yet in
operation.
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3.3 “Bottlenecks at the Bank”: criticism of
the GEF
Although one of the aims of the GEF in operating
the financial mechanisms of the Rio Conventions
was to make funding for global environmental
concerns more efficient, the GEF has not escaped
criticism. Attacks have come from NGOs and
developed and developing countries alike.
Perhaps as a result of its affiliation with theWorld
Bank, or perhaps because of its unorthodox legal
stature, theGEF is a bureaucratic jungle. It has been
regularly lambasted by developing countries for
the inordinate delays and cost involved in the
preparation, approval and disbursement of funding
for projects. For full-scale projects, the necessary
planning process can take up to 18 months and
then the wait before approval at theGEFGoverning
Council can be up to another five months.
Disbursement of funding requires a further round
of paperwork, and if a grant is required for project
preparation, the wait can be around 12 months
(Yamin and Depledge 2004, Ch. 10: 39). Recent
COPs have requested the GEF to streamline its
project cycle but this is taking a long time and there
is little sign things will change dramatically. Thus
centralising climate funding through a single
institution does lead to lengthier approval times
and delays. Not least because there are legitimate
demands that it operate in a transparent fashion,
such as by publishing all project documentation
on the internet and allowing consultations in project
design, implementation and theGEF’s owndecision-
making procedures.
An additional focus of criticism (and delays) is
the complex procedure for calculating incremental
costs. This has been criticised ever since the first
COP, first for being too inflexible and later for being
too ad hoc. The GEF has again received guidance
from subsequent COPs to continue to make the
concept more transparent and understandable but
theGEF has yet to report on the results of the latest
requests by COP 8. The most intractable current
problem is the relevance of incremental cost concept
with adaptation projects (discussed by Huq and
Reid, this Bulletin, Klein et al. 2002; and Adger et
al. 2002).
The biggest source of criticism is the low level
of funding given to the GEF when compared with
developing country expectations at Rio and when
compared with their actual needs. The issue of
absolute levels of funding raises two issues: co-
financing and the spread and tracking, of climate
aid among bilateral andmultilateral channels. The
issue of co-financing, i.e. the ratio of money
leveraged by theGEF through use of its resources,
has recently become an important issue with some
developing countries suggestingGEFproject should
achieve ratios in the order of 12 to 1, rather than
the 3 to 5, as currently leveraged by theGEF (Yamin
and Depledge 2004: Ch. 10). But trying to assess
what counts as GEF co-financingmeans addressing
important definitional and methodological
problems as to what resources are to count as
available to a country or a project and then
separating these out from those provided by the
GEF.
The second issue of the spread and tracking, of
climate aid between theGEF and other bilateral and
multilateral flows also raises definitional and
methodological issues about what is to count as
“climate change” related aid.Gaining a clear picture
of the quantity of funds flowing through non-GEF
routes is not easy.UNFCCCnational communication
reporting guidelines require donor countries (Annex
II Parties) to report on their climate related
contributions to theGEF and bilateral, regional and
multilateral channels and these provide an important
source of information.9 But these requirements are
fairly recent and still allow data to be presented in
an often incomparable fashion,making the tracking
of climate aid quite difficult.
The OECD DAC has only recently begun to
address the problem of bilateral ODA reporting
requirements in respect to the all the Rio
Conventions (OECD, DAC 2002). As part of this
process, the DAC has arrived at a rough estimate
for bilateral aid in pursuit of theUNFCCC, putting
it at aroundUS$2.7 billion per annum i.e., almost
four times theGEF annual budget for all of its focal
areas from 2002–06. If correct, this figure implies
much higher levels of climate funding showing that
bilateral agencies appear strongly committed to the
cause of climate change but, of course, much
depends of what is being counted as “climate
change” activities.
If theOECD DAC findings are broadly correct,
they would imply, however, in climate change, as
with other kinds of aid, donors are continuing to
assist their preferred countries bilaterally in the
manner that suits them, rather than following the
sense and spirit of politically guidance agreed
through the COP by channelling funding through
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the Convention’s financial mechanism. Research
by the UNFCCC Secretariat, for example, shows
that amajority of bilateral assistance between 1997
and 1999 was spent on climate change mitigation
not adaptation activities crucial to protecting
vulnerable populations. Finally, since there is no
evidence to the contrary, it can be assumed that
these aid flows are occurring in a similar manner
to ODA in other areas, giving rise to aid
fragmentation and larger, transaction costs.
4 Policy issues and suggestions
Understanding how much funding is going to
climate activities and through what kind of funding
channels, is important if climate funding is to be
better organised, as it must be. This means that
greater transparency is needed first of all in tracking
down who is funding what and why. Although
political pressures at theCOP have led to new funds
being established, these funds could remain empty
or attract very low levels of funding if donors
continue to prefer bilateral funding, avoiding the
coordinated,more centralised approach that have
been politically preferred by the COP and which
are perhaps more efficient in delivering aid. This is
perhaps to be expected.As noted in the 2004World
Development Report, incentives for bilateral
channels and the political economy of aid in
recipient countries work against the consolidation/
coordination of aid. These reasons include:
n Aid agencies want to be able to identify their
own contributions often through distinct
projects.
n Agencies need to show quick results to taxpayers.
n Policy makers in donor countries are tied to
certain interest groups that place a high priority
on funding like-minded institutions in
developing countries.
n Donors are oftenmost comfortable with service
delivery systems of the type operating in their
own country.
n Donors may distribute money across a wide
number of projects and sectors to increase their
visibility (an example of intentional proliferation)
(World Bank 2004: 216–7).
Avoiding lengthy bureaucratic delays trying to
steer funding through theGEF’s complex procedures
and its restrictive requirements, regarding
incremental costs, for example, could also be
legitimate reasons for avoiding more centralised,
multilateral channels. Additionally, as stressed by
Acharya et al. (2004) some pluralism in funding is
beneficial as this allows for experimentation, and
provides choice for recipient governments and
healthy competition between donors. Deciding
where the balance lies between coordination and
centralisation on the one hand and bilateral free-
for-all on the other, will only be possible if we can
first pin down what is happening to climate flows
as a whole, which requires far more research.
For all the criticisms heaped upon it, the climate
change regime is fortunate in having established a
financial mechanism under the political control of
theCOP and one whichhas over the years improved
its standing withNGOs and developing countries
alike. Its equitable governance structure that
balances the interests of donors and beneficiaries,
its ability to fund large projects coherent
programmes in a strategic manner that avoids at
least some of the “bittiness” of many donor efforts
are important advantages. Its position as a
multilateral institution with central oversight gives
it a degree of responsiveness, efficiency, fairness
and accountability lacking in any other institution
(Sjöberg 1996). Because the very existence of the
GEF ensures some degree of donor coordination
and coherence in climate funding, its continued
support and greater use would be of merit.
Because in the real world bilateral funding of
climate activities will continue (for the political
economy reasons discussed above), it is also
important for climate policy makers to examine
other policy suggestions addressing the problems
of proliferation.
First,donors need to becomemore acutely aware
of the negative impacts of proliferation. The
dissemination of research and calls for greater
coordination among donors and between donors
and recipient governments, as evidenced by the
suggestions contained in the 2004 World
Development Report, for example, will hopefully
set the stage for progressive donors to think about
better coordination of their aid flows.
Improving reporting requirements by donors
under the UNFCCC as well as better use of data
held by the OECD and the GEF is critical for
ensuring transparency, avoid duplication of efforts
and to enable policy makers to know which
areas/sectors/countries are receiving too little
funding, or perhaps too much.
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So far as specific suggestions are concerned,
Acharya et al. (2004) lay out four different
approaches to aid integration that have been used
in the past: (1) coordination, (2) sector-wide
approaches (SWAps), (3) budgetary support, (4)
sector specialisation. The application of these
approaches and how these might be used in the
context of the climate regime with its distinctive
multilaterally constituted funding arrangements,
also deserves more attention, but requires far more
work. Not least because experience with these
approaches has been limited and when it has
occurred has drawn criticism. Even the most
popular approach of the last decade, SWAps, has
been criticised for poor uptake, long preparation
and implementation periods and for weakening
the recipient’s compact between its policy makers
and provider organisations by taking the sector out
of the domestic decisionmaking process (Pavignani
and Hauck 2002; Adam and Gunning 2002).
The integration of climate change considerations
into existing development projects is another,
essentially complementary, approach that might
decrease proliferation (see Huq and Reid, this
Bulletin, on the challenges of mainstreaming
adaptation) and one favoured by theOECD DAC.
Whether the provision of a checklist of tools that
enable development professionals to better consider
the cross-over effects of projects with the Rio
Convention issues, as suggested by theOECD, will
help is something that needs to be researched and
assessed. Exposure of development professionals
to such tools might enable them to consolidate their
capacity to integrate RioConvention aims into the
policies of their own agencies.Or use of these tools
could turn out to be another time-consuming
exercise or another funding conditionality that has
to be met.
5 Conclusions
Overall aid budgets are constrained and even if
these were to increase significantly tomatch needs,
the negative impacts of aid proliferation would
remain. These impacts raise issues donors find
difficult to address. The Convention’s financial
mechanism and its refinement over a decade was
intended to avoid some of these problems. In some
respects, therefore the climate change regime is
already streets ahead in trying to advance
coordination among donors and recipients.
Although many problems are being addressed by
theCOP and by theGEF,many remain.One of the
key issues in the climate change will be what to do
about the large parallel flows of bilateral aid and
the problems of aid proliferation this is known to
create. While some level of autonomous project
activity funding through bilateral aid is healthy (to
encourage diversity, experimentation and
competition among donor), much of it is not.
Deciding where the balance lies will require much
better communication between both donors and
recipients and by policy makers within the climate
and development communities.
IDS Bulletin 35.3 Climate Change and Development
74
Notes
* The author wishes to thank Mick Moore and Farhana
Yamin on advising on this article and reviewing earlier
drafts.
1. “Progressive” in this context basically entails a focus on
general poverty alleviation as opposed to large financial
transfers to countries important for national self-interest.
2. It is posited that the proliferation of aid to smaller countries
is due to the “UN effect”, whereby the votes of small
developing countries in the General Assembly are
“bought” by developed countries through providing them
with aid.
3. Effectively equivalent to a Constitution.
4. Countries that are undergoing a transition to a market
economy, i.e. former members of the Soviet Union and
other former communist states of Eastern Europe. The
official list can be seen in Annex I of the FCCC.
5. See also GEF Operational strategy for Climate Change,
http://www.gefweb.org/public/opstrat/ch3.htm#notes3.
6. FCCC/CP/2003/3, GEF Annual Report to COP 9. See
also FCCC/CP/2002/8.
7. FCCC/SBI/2001/15, CGE Report, p. 25 and Table 1.
8. FCCC/TP/2003/2, para. 53 andOECD, 2002.
9. FCCC/CP/1999/7, Section VII.
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